As part of Iravaban.net‘s interview series “Judges of Armenia”, we spoke with Hovik Shahnazaryan, judge of the Anti-Corruption Court of Appeals. The judge discussed his career choice, various characteristics of judicial work, systemic issues, and other field-related matters.
-Mr. Shahnazaryan, you were born in Khndzoresk, Syunik. Could you tell us about your choice of profession and your move from your native village to Yerevan?
-When I was 6-7 years old, living in Khndzoresk village, our country was in extremely harsh and complex conditions. The liberation movement was ongoing, and in our village, as in all other settlements in Armenia, intense battles were taking place. Groups of freedom fighters and police were forming, who were essentially fighting for people’s, the nation’s, and the homeland’s right to life. At that time, there wasn’t, as such, a legislative framework or rights derived from law. There was one right – the right of force, and the executors of this right were these “fedayeen” (freedom fighters). Based on these perceptions, I developed a desire to protect people’s rights, which at that time was only possible through these people’s methods. The desire to protect rights began in childhood. I developed an aspiration to become a lawyer.
-What was your feeling after presiding over your first court session? And, if you remember, please tell us about the case that impressed you the most?
-When I was introduced as a judge, on the very day of my appointment, I was assigned two serious motions, from a criminal aspect, although I had been appointed as a civil court judge. One concerned the application of detention as a preventive measure for a high-ranking official, and the other was about applying detention for a person involved in drug trafficking.
Why do I consider this case important? In that court session, the person’s mother was an acting judge, and the mother-in-law was a former prosecutor – incidentally, they were very well-known people. I was in a moral-psychological, emotional, and legal struggle. Was I doing the right thing? I realized that I needed to act based on legal requirements. The first contradictions and overcoming them occurred within the framework of this case.
-Mr. Shahnazaryan, have you ever experienced various pressures as a judge?
-Well, typically, pressures can be direct and indirect. Let’s start with direct pressures: telephone justice, illegal interference, and so on. These are criminally punishable acts. In my life, since 2014, I have never experienced direct pressure. I can’t say why I haven’t, but I can assert where this comes from. When you remain faithful to your behavioral principles and demonstrate through your conduct that pressure is pointless because justice will be administered as it should be, automatically such pressures cease to exist.
-You are the chairman of the Ethics and Disciplinary Commission of the General Assembly of Judges. Today, the executive also has the authority to submit motions for disciplinary action against judges. International organizations have repeatedly insisted that this executive power should be terminated. The executive, in turn, states that the commission in its current composition cannot be impartial. The Minister also noted that manifestations of corporatism must be excluded. In your opinion, can the commission make impartial decisions today?
-It would be absurd for me to say that the commission makes partial decisions. It makes impartial decisions. Now, to convince the public that my conclusion about this impartial decision-making is truthful and fair, I need to provide certain information, reveal certain circumstances that may or may not be known to the public.
We don’t make decisions detached from reality – I’m not saying the ministry does, I’m just explaining why it’s perceived this way from an impartiality perspective. For example, if a judge has 4,000 cases in their proceedings and has committed a procedural violation, delayed for several months, for instance, in organizing the process of sending judicial acts, in this context we also evaluate the objective situation, where the state has undertaken the obligation to do everything possible to prevent such a level of workload. Now, if this workload exists, can we blame the judge for all of this? There is also a question of absence of fault here.
Even if the commission makes a corresponding decision on a collegial principle, one shouldn’t look only at the commission’s decision, because some decisions are accompanied by such special opinions.
Details in the video.
Mariam Antonyan
